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I. Introduction
Legal uncertainty is a universal feature of primary legal materials in all legal
systems. The need for judicial interpretation arises from the fact of legal cer-
tainty in legal texts. In theory, judicial interpretation is a process which should
be governed and constrained by legal methodology. The law must impose meth-
odological constraint, because in the absence of methodological constraint the
judicial process would be little more than arbitrary.
The judicial process in national or domestic legal systems is governed by
broad criteria and traditions specific to each system, although in practice
there is considerable convergence as to the various approaches judges may
apply. Formally Treaty Interpretation in international law is governed by the
rules of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.1 Unfortunately, how-
ever, just as legal uncertainty can never be wholly eliminated in primarily legal
materials—whether in statutes or in treaties—there is no legal system where the
accepted rules of interpretation and those governing their application are not
likewise subject to legal uncertainty. Judicial discretion therefore is a fact of
judicial life. The academic literature nonetheless distinguishes between courts
whose interpretative approach is primarily text based and those which more
liberally draw on other alternative criteria, especially teleological and policy
criteria. Courts of the former type seek to minimize judicial discretion, typically
ideal for cases where the text itself is ambiguous, whilst courts of the latter type
expand judicial discretion beyond the sphere of textual uncertainty and seek to
interpret legal instruments with reference both to the text and its underlying
objects and purposes, which may be construed narrowly or more widely, and not
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necessarily with giving primacy to the former. Courts of the latter type are
therefore also referred to as ‘activist’.
This article argues that the Court of Justice of the EU (CJEU) firmly belongs
to the second of those categories of courts and, most notably in cases raising
fundamental issues involving the distribution of legal competences between the
European institutions and those of EU Member States, favours an activist pur-
pose-based and gap-filling approach, which maximizes judicial discretion and, in
case of conflict, often prioritizes the purposes of European integration over a
more text-based interpretation, where the latter may suggest a less integrationist
outcome. Universal rules of interpretation as enshrined in the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties are thus relied upon on a selective—if not
instrumentalist—basis, as the next sections will show.
II. The sources of legal uncertainty
There are, broadly speaking, four types of legal uncertainty:
1. Linguistic vagueness which includes conceptual uncertainty and other linguis-
tic ambiguities.
2. Value pluralism which, in the law, manifests itself in norm collision. Norm
collision arises when the answer to a legal question may be governed by several
applicable rules and/or principles which may conflict and suggest different
interpretative outcomes, and it is unclear which rule or principle should take
precedence because their normative status in the hierarchy of norms may be
equal or indeterminate in relation to each other. Norm conflict commonly
arises in cases where courts are asked to balance conflicting human rights, such
as the conflicting demands of the right to privacy and freedom of expression.2
Other obvious examples of such norm collision are the conflictual relationship
between any of the four freedoms of movement in EU law and fundamental
rights in EU law3 or conflicts between any of the four freedoms of movement
and the treaty- or case law-based public policy exceptions to these freedoms.4
Both in EU and ECHR [European Convention on Human Rights] law, such
conflicts, either between conflicting rights or between rights and freedoms, are
frequently settled with reference to the principle of proportionality. The
vagueness of standards such as proportionality, however, means that an in-
stance of norm collision is simply transformed into a balancing act involving
2 Eg Arts 8 and 10 ECHR.
3 See eg Case C-112/00 Schmidberger v Austria [2003] ECR I-5659 and Case C-36/03 Omega
Spielhallen- und Automatenaufstellungs-GmbH v Oberbu¨rgermeisterin der Bundesstadt Bonn [2004]
ECR I-9609.
4 See e.g. Case C-438/05 The International Transport Workers’ Federation and The Finnish Seamen’s
Union v Viking Line ABP and OU¨ Viking Line Eest [2007] I-10779 and Case C-341/05 Laval Un
Partneri Ltd v Svenska Byggnadsarbetarefo¨rbundet [2007] ECR I-11767.
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the application of a conceptually uncertain standard which, by itself, imposes
no, or little, constraint on judicial discretion.
3. Rule instability, which is specific to precedents5—because precedents, unlike
written rules, have no stable and agreed wording. In English law, the ratio of a
case is formally binding although it may be stated at different levels of ab-
straction and restated with different words; in other legal systems and EU law,
precedents are treated as principles which are not formally binding and the
precise wording of which is likewise not fixed and which also evolve, expand
and contract, and are adapted over time. Rule instability must be distinguished
from vagueness which, like norm collision, equally applies to written and
judge-made laws. As stated above, vagueness is here used to refer to the lin-
guistic uncertainty of particular words or phrases. By contrast, rule instability
refers to uncertainty arising from changes in the specific judicial formulation
of a rule or principle, and not as uncertainty arising from the words them-
selves. It may therefore also be described as wording instability, which only
applies to rules or interpretations of rules established by case law, because
written rules are fixed until they are amended.
4. Gaps in the law, where a court has to decide an issue which is governed by no
obvious primary legal materials or precedents.
These four factors exist in all legal systems, and they explain why law is often
uncertain as well as the need for judicial interpretation. Often, these types of
legal uncertainty overlap. Norms of indeterminate status relative to each other
conflict, additionally each norm may be vague in one or more respects, and
previous judicial interpretations of the applicable norms may have removed
some uncertainties of interpretation but given rise to new conceptual uncertain-
ties and, moreover, it may not be clear whether their scope is confined to specific
issues or general principles. Precedents may, in addition, also function as general
authoritative interpretations, which complement or effectively replace the word-
ing of a written rule with a judicial interpretation of it.
Not even the most skilled and careful draftsman can fully escape the effects of
linguistic vagueness and the other forms of legal uncertainty. The sources of legal
uncertainty explain why judicial interpretation cannot yield certainty. Primary
legal uncertainty is reproduced at the secondary level of judicial interpretation
for several reasons. First, there is no one generally accepted interpretative
method or even methods. All there are, are multiple interpretative criteria: lit-
eral, purposive and systemic arguments, and in addition historical, comparative,
and quasi-logical ones as well as maxims of general practical reasoning, such as a
fortiori or ad absurdum arguments and, failing everything else, common sense
5 The term ‘precedent’ is used in a broad sense here, as referring not only to formally binding
decisions—there is no doctrine of formally binding precedents in EU law—but to previous judicial
decisions relevant to a given case or specific issues arising in it.
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and everyday reasoning. Secondly, the literal meaning of a legal provision is
often not in doubt, yet if concepts are unclear so will be there literal meaning.
And just as most law students, who go to university to obtain a law degree, do
not see the degree as the end purpose, but as a purpose which is at the same time
also a means to another, more long-term objective, such as making a living,
practising law, or as a stepping stone to another career, legal rules rarely have just
one purpose but several, some of which may be immediate and text-based,
whilst others will be long-term and not obvious from the legislation at all.
And where there are applicable precedents, these themselves need to be applied
to new factual scenarios by reference to their literal meaning or purposes, and
therefore pose the added problem of being capable of being stated and restated
at different levels of abstraction, of being distinguished or applied by analogy, of
being narrowed or widened and, generally, of evolving over time. Finally, the key
problem is that for the application of the various interpretative criteria or topoi,
there are no clear rules, or meta-rules which tell the judge how to apply which
criterion in which circumstances or, more generally, in what order of priority the
interpretative criteria are to be applied in each case.
Judges, in other words, have no method which tells them that in the case
before them they have to apply the natural or technical meaning, whilst in
another case a teleological approach is to be preferred and so forth: the process
of legal interpretation leaves them free to choose and decide how to resolve the
uncertainty, often on a case by case basis. The persistence of legal uncertainty at
the secondary level of judicial interpretation raises two obvious issues:
First, legal reasoning cannot be scientific or methodological, in the sense that
its outcomes can be verified by a shared or accepted method of argumentation.
It is and can only be heuristic. By that I mean that the good lawyer, trying to
advise or anticipate how judges will decide, need not only master the applicable
legal materials, precedents, and interpretative criteria, but also has to take ac-
count of the institutional, political, and wider context in which judicial deci-
sions are made, and of anything he knows about the judge’s or court’s personal
motivation. For these will determine how the judicial axe will fall. Practical legal
reasoning, in other words, requires both an appreciation of the acceptable jus-
tificatory arguments in a case, and an evaluation of the relevant political, social,
institutional, and personal background relevant to the Court’s decision making
in each case. It requires one to assess how the conventions of legal argumenta-
tion, if they exist at all, and the justificatory discourse constrain the Court, if
indeed it does so at all, to say what it is inclined to say taking account of any
extra-legal constraints on its motivation. It follows that one can reckon, but not
predict, what a court will do, because there is no formula which guides the
decision making of even a wholly unbiased court.
Secondly, if there is no methodological certainty, or, at any rate, if there are no
methodolodical boundaries for judicial reasoning and decision making, this
would mean that legal interpretation is ultimately just a matter of discretion
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and convenience and that judges cannot be criticized for getting the law wrong.
And if judges cannot be shown to get the law wrong, then the idea of the rule of
law is at best a ‘noble lie’. Thus, if law is to be more than either politics or
judicial convenience, it must impose some methodological constraint. Yet, how
can judicial decisions based on the legitimate exercise of judicial discretion
under conditions of legal uncertainty be distinguished from judicial choices
‘as the continuation of politics by other means’? There is no generally accepted
answer but the Vienna Convention on the Laws of Treaties and the different
judicial approaches that have evolved under it, which point to an obvious one
based on the idea that the wording of a provision where clear should be con-
clusive.6 A distinction must thus be drawn between cases where the natural
meaning of a legal rule is clear and those where it is not. In the second type
of cases judges are not merely free but forced to exercise judicial discretion; in
the first type of cases they choose to exercise judicial choice, even though they
are not forced to. In the first type of case the exercise of judicial discretion is
unnecessary and may be regarded as illegitimate on the grounds that the judges
effectively usurp the role of legislator. In the second type of case the exercise of
judicial discretion may be unavoidable, but it can be constrained by the require-
ment that the relevant legal context be confined to the legislation or treaty of
which the legal provision in issue forms part and that the range of relevant
objects and purposes be limited to those found in the text and that teleological
considerations may not be invoked to support a contra legem interpretation.
Judges cease merely to make law and begin to exceed the judicial function of
applying, rather than making law, when they override the natural meaning of a
legal provision or its obvious purpose disclosed by the provision and its legal
context, or, where there is no applicable legal provision and they start filling the
gaps without declining jurisdiction, or depart from their own precedents where
these have been formulated in accordance with appropriately defined interpret-
ative rules or parameters. Inevitably, the methodological constraints hinted at
can and must be refined further and cannot be exhaustive. Furthermore, grey
areas will inevitably remain, for instance where the wording is unclear and there
is no one clear purpose, or there are conflicting norms of equal normative status.
Nevertheless, the distinction between the necessary and usurped exercise of
judicial discretion, and that between decisions which respect the natural
6 This conclusion is, of course, disputed by many commentators whose number is too large to
require examples. Suffice it to say that it is not the author’s position that the purposes or the wider
legal context of a provision have no role to play in its judicial interpretation. The objects of a
provision are relevant where the ordinary meaning of written rules is ambiguous or unclear, or
where there are higher legal rules, ie those of generally accepted superior normative status such as
constitutional provisions, with which they conflict. However, if in other circumstances, judges are
authorized to discard the clear meaning of a provision for putative underlying purposes, which are
not disclosed by the legal provisions in question, they patently assume the role of law-makers. The
distinction between law-making and the application of the law is blurred, and legal certainty—one of
the most basic principles of all legal systems—is undermined.
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meaning of legal rules and methodological constraints and decisions which
extend the exercise of judicial discretion beyond those constraints provides a
useful framework for categorizing different judicial approaches even in view of
the inescapable fact of legal uncertainty.
If the judicial function is above all to apply the law and only make law where
the rules are unclear, then the distinction between the necessary and unnecessary
exercise of judicial discretion may also be appropriately described as the differ-
ence between legitimate judicial law-making and judicial law-breaking.
However, the purpose of this article is not to set out a comprehensive theory
of the legitimate exercise of the judicial function, but rather to show that if, as
we must assume, law should impose methodological constraints and not do
violence unto language, the CJEU adopts a judicial approach which, in cases
where the Court so desires, leaves it almost entirely free from methodological
constraints, and free to disregard the wording of treaty provisions where it sees
fit. In its near-complete freedom ‘from’ constraints and ‘to’ do what it likes, the
Court of Justice, on a spectrum of plausible approaches to legal argumentation
sanctioned by the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT), should be
placed at the very extreme end of judicial activism. Indeed, unless one takes the
view that the VCLT imposes no or hardly any methodological constraints, the
Court of Justice may be regarded as exceeding that scope of discretion afforded
by it.
III. Treaty interpretation
The general rules of treaty interpretation are set out in Articles 31 and 32 of the
VCLT. The Vienna Convention rules apply, in principle, to all international
courts or tribunals, irrespective of their institutional set-up, subject matter, or
geographical scope.
Articles 31 and 32 VCLToffer two main principles of interpretation. The first
general rule (Article 31)7 is that treaties must be interpreted in ‘good faith’, in
7 Article 31 General rule of interpretation:
1. A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given
to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose.
2. The context for the purpose of the interpretation of a treaty shall comprise, in addition to the
text, including its preamble and annexes:
(a) any agreement relating to the treaty which was made between all the parties in connexion with
the conclusion of the treaty;
(b) any instrument which was made by one or more parties in connexion with the conclusion of
the treaty and accepted by the other parties as an instrument related to the treaty.
3. There shall be taken into account, together with the context:
(a) any subsequent agreement between the parties regarding the interpretation of the treaty or the
application of its provisions;
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accordance with the ‘ordinary meaning’ of the ‘terms’ or text of the treaty, in
their ‘context’, and in light of the treaty’s ‘object and purpose’. The VCLT’s
second supplementary principle (Article 32)8 is that the ‘preparatory work of the
treaty and the circumstances of its conclusion’ are only secondary sources of
interpretation, to confirm meaning established under the first principle or in
case the meaning of the treaty remains unclear or leads to an absurd result.
As general rules, these VCLT rules apply to all treaties, irrespective of the
subject matter, goal, or number of parties to the treaty. Article 31 makes clear
that the text must be the starting point of judicial interpretation and that the
words in the text must be given their ordinary meaning, although it goes on to
say that that meaning is to be established in context, with reference to other
textual provisions and their objects and purpose. Thus, although according to
the VCLT interpretation must start with the text of the treaty and Article 31
imposes a general framework of interpretation, the Convention rules are not
without ambiguity and so a certain measure of discretion remains. In particular
Article 31, whilst it states that a treaty must be interpreted ‘in accordance with
the ordinary meaning’ of its terms, also refers to the context and the purposes of
the words in question, and it does not expressly state which of these three criteria
is to prevail in cases where their application may lead to different conclusions.
Article 32 VCLToffers further guidance, in that it allows the tribunal to confirm
the meaning resulting from the application of Article 31 VCLT, and thus, by
implication, of choosing between different possible interpretations suggested by
the various criteria, by taking account of the travaux pre´paratoires and the cir-
cumstances of the conclusion of a treaty. However, recourse to these supple-
mentary criteria is optional, not mandatory. In addition, the academic literature
favours the view that the VCLT rules, although generally applicable, are not
necessarily exhaustive, and other additional principles or guidelines may exist or
can develop as part of customary international law or within specific treaty
regimes. This gives international tribunals additional flexibility.9
It has been suggested that the VCLT describes treaty interpretation ‘as a
holistic, non-hierarchical exercise’ which involves the ‘summing up of text,
(b) any subsequent practice in the application of the treaty which establishes the agreement of the
parties regarding its interpretation;
(c) any relevant rules of international law applicable in the relations between the parties.
4. A special meaning shall be given to a term if it is established that the parties so intended.
8 Article 32 Supplementary means of interpretation:
Recourse may be had to supplementary means of interpretation, including the preparatory work of the
treaty and the circumstances of its conclusion, in order to confirm the meaning resulting from the
application of Article 31, or to determine the meaning when the interpretation according to Article 31:
(a) leaves the meaning ambiguous or obscure; or
(b) leads to a result which is manifestly absurd or unreasonable.
9 Joost Pauwelyn and Manfred Elsig, ‘The Politics of Treaty Interpretation: Variations and
Explanations across International Tribunals’, in Jeffrey L Dunoff and Mark A Pollack (eds),
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012) 445–74, at 448.
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context, and purpose’, ‘albeit one that starts with the text of the treaty’.10 This
view is open to challenge on the grounds that, although Article 31 does not
expressly state that the ordinary meaning of the terms of the text should always
prevail over its purpose and object, Article 31 clearly states that the treaty text
must be given its ‘ordinary meaning’, implying that it is only when that mean-
ing is ambiguous or ‘manifestly absurd or unreasonable’ (Article 32) that con-
textual or teleological criteria may prevail over the text. It is thus only for a good
reason, that is, textual ambiguity, vagueness, or absurdity, that the ordinary
meaning of a treaty provision may be displaced by an interpretation based on
its context or underlying purpose. Article 32 further suggests that in determin-
ing the ordinary meaning of the text, courts may adopt an historical approach by
looking at the preparatory works and circumstances leading to the conclusion of
the treaty.
In the academic literature on the subject and in judicial practice, broadly three
main schools of thought of treaty interpretation are commonly distinguished.11
These may conveniently be called the ‘intention of the parties’ school, which is
also sometimes referred to as the ‘founding fathers’ school;12 the ‘textual’ or
10 Georges Abi-Saab, ‘The Appellate Body and Treaty Interpretation’, in Malgosia Fitzmaurice,
Olufemi Elias, and Panos Merkouris (eds), Treaty Interpretation and the Vienna Convention on the
Law of Treaties: 30 Years on (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff, 2010) at 99–109.
11 For discussions of the various schools of treaty interpretation, see for instance Anthony Aust,
Modern Treaty Law and Practice (2nd edn, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007); Richard
K Gardiner, Treaty Interpretation (2nd edn, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008); David J
Bederman with Christopher J Borgen and David A Martin, International Law: A Handbook for
Judges (Washington, DC: American Society of International Law, 2003); AD McNair, The Law of
Treaties (2nd edn, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1961); Ian Sinclair,The Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties (2nd edn, Manchester: Manchester University Press 1984); RP Schaffer, ‘Current Trends in
Treaty Interpretation and the South African Approach’ (1981) 7 Australian Yearbook of International
Law 129, 130.
12 Most academic and judicial interpreters agree that the task bestowed on them is to give effect to
the intention of the parties. In that sense the intention-based approach is the least contentious. At the
time, there is no agreement as to the criteria for establishing intention. Assuming the parties say what
they mean, the textual school contends that intention is best inferred from the ordinary meaning of
the words in the text. Moderate criticisms of the textual approach emphasize that text is but one
element and that the interpreter needs to dig deeper to uncover the actual, subjective intentions of the
parties, for example, by looking at the preparatory works of a treaty. On this point, refer to Hersch
Lauterpacht, ‘De l’Interpretation des Traite´s: Rapport’ (1950) 43(2) Annuaire de l’Institut du Droit
International 366; Myres S McDougal, Harold D Lasswell, and James CMiller, The Interpretation of
International Agreements and World Public Order: Principles of Content and Procedure (New Haven,
CT: Yale University Press, 1967). The third approach is to focus not so much on the raw text of the
treaty or the subjective intentions of the drafters themselves, but on the underlying objectives these
drafters were attempting to achieve—the so-called teleological approach, see George Letsas,
‘Strasbourg’s Interpretive Ethic: Lessons for the International Lawyer’ (2012) 21(3) European
Journal of International Law 509, at 512. Thus, a tribunal’s dominant hermeneutic can be text,
party intent, or objective. In that sense the intention-based approach disguises rather than settles
underlying disagreement about the corrected approach to treaty interpretation. In particular it does
not settle the fundamental disagreement between those favouring a textual, teleological, or historical
approach to treaty exegesis. In the final analysis, therefore, the intention-based approach, broadly
construed, is an umbrella term, which may refer to any one, or mixture, of the other approaches. It is
only when it is construed in a narrow sense, as the subjective intention of the parties, the term
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‘ordinary meaning of the words’ school;13 and the ‘teleological’ or ‘aims and
objectives’ school.14 The ideas of these schools are not necessarily exclusive of
one another, and theories of treaty interpretation can be constructed (and indeed
are normally held) compounded of all three.15 The VCLT and the academic
literature on the subject refer to all three elements underlying these approaches.
Moreover, as so often, the academic literature, much less than the text of the
VCLT, does not settle which is to prevail in cases of conflicting outcomes.
The VCLT generally applies to all treaties and tribunals. However, the textual
ambiguities and the lack of doctrinal guidance in the literature and case law gov-
erning the application of Articles 31 and 32 gives tribunals considerable scope for
manoeuvre and it is often an open question whether, on any particular interpret-
ative issue, a tribunal will rely primarily on: (a) the text of the treaty; (b) the intent
of the parties to the treaty; or (c) the underlying objective that the treaty seeks to
attain. Divergence between international tribunals in the practical application of
the VCLT rules of treaty interpretation has not gone unnoticed in the academic
literature.16 When applying VCLT rules, some tribunals are more likely to be
guided by the text, whilst others give greater weight to other factors (especially
the objective) and favour a more teleological, creative interpretative approach.
International tribunals that are associated with the textual approach are the
WTO’s Appellate Body,17 or the International Court of Justice (ICJ). By con-
trast, examples of international tribunals that tend to favour a teleological ap-
proach are the CJEU18 and the European Court of Human Rights.19 Both these
courts take an evolutionary approach to treaty interpretation in that they take
acquires a distinctive meaning. Some authors, of course, prefer to refer to ‘subjective intention’ in
terms of either the historical or genetic approach.
13 The textualist approach maintains that the best and most objective expression of intent can be
found in the treaty text itself. See, for instance, Gerald Fitzmaurice, ‘The Law and Procedure of the
International Court of Justice: Treaty Interpretation and Certain Other Treaty Points’ (1951) 28
British Yearbook of International Law 1, at 204–5; Alexander P Fachiri, ‘Interpretation of Treaties’
(1929) 23(4) American Journal of International Law at 745–52; Alexander Orakhelashvili, The
Interpretation of Acts and Rules in Public International Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2008); Alexander Orakhelashvili, ‘Restrictive Interpretation of Human Rights Treaties in the
Recent Jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights’ (2003) 14(3) European Journal of
International Law 529.
14 For examples of the teleological approach, see, for instance, Hersch Lauterpacht, ‘Restrictive
Interpretation and the Principle of Effectiveness in the Interpretation of Treaties’ (1949) 26 British
Yearbook of International Law 48; Letsas (n 12).
15 Fitzmaurice(n 13), 1.
16 JHHWeiler, ‘Preface: The Interpretation of Treaties—a Re-examination’ (2010) 21(3) European
Journal of International Law, at 507; Pauwelyn and Elsig (n 9), 451–2.
17 See eg Abi-Saab (n 10), 106.
18 See for instance Koen Lenaerts, ‘Interpretation and the Court of Justice: A Basis for Comparative
Reflection’ (2007) 41(4) The International Lawyer at 1011–32.
19 See eg V Tzevelekos, ‘The Use of Article 31(3)(c) of the VCLT in the Case-law of the ECtHR: an
Effective Anti-Fragmentation Tool or a Selective Loophole for the Reinforcement of the Teleology of
Human Rights? Between Evolution and Systemic Integration’ (2010) 31Michigan Journal of International
Law 621–90; Malgosia Fitzmaurice, ‘Interpretation of Human Rights Treaties’, in Dinah Shelton (ed.),
The Oxford Handbook of International Human Rights Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013) 739.
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legal instruments as ‘living instruments’ whose meaning is not tied to the ori-
ginal and historical understanding of textual terms at the time of their conclu-
sion nor to the subjective intention of the parties as may be deduced from the
preparatory works. Tribunals favouring the textual school may also be described
as deferential to the parties of the treaty: they are more likely to regard them-
selves as agents giving effect to the intention of the parties, in particular as
revealed by the text or the historical documents surrounding its conclusion.
Teleological courts, by contrast, are activist and gap-filling beyond the rules
provided for in the treaty. They are more likely to regard themselves as ‘self-
confident agents’ operating largely independently of the parties that made the
treaty and established the tribunal.20
IV. The Court of Justice’s approach
The Court of Justice itself has summarized its interpretative approach in Merck v
Hauptzollamt Hamburg-Jonas as follows:
. . . in interpreting a provision of [Union] law it is necessary to consider not only its
wording, but also the context in which it occurs and the objects of the rules of which
it is part.21
In general terms, the CJEU at first sight appears to echo the text of Article 31
VCLT.22 Its approach to legal interpretation also appears conventional in other
respects. In many respects its legal argumentation does not, at first sight, differ
fundamentally from that of other courts, especially that of most national con-
stitutional and international courts. The CJEU appears to apply many of the
same techniques and arguments, although, in such broad terms, this applies to
most courts in practically all modern legal systems.23 Second, the CJEU relies on
the literal meaning of provisions more frequently than on any other consider-
ation, except its own previous decisions. In 2011, the Court referred to the
wording or particular provisions in nearly 97 per cent of its decisions, compared
to 74 per cent for purposive arguments.24 The Court thus does not ignore but
places greater emphasis on the wording than other criteria. And third, the CJEU
20 Pauwelyn and Elsig (n 9), 455.
21 Case C-292/82 Merck v Hauptzollamt Hamburg-Jonas [1983] ECR-3781, para. 12.
22 As will be shown, some commentators have rightly concluded that the Court follows instead a
‘meta-teleological’ approach. See, for instance, Violeta Moreno-Lax, ‘Of Autonomy, Autarky,
Purposiveness and Fragmentation: The Relationship between EU Asylum Law and International
Humanitarian Law’, in DJ Cantor and J-F Durieux (eds), Refuge from Inhumanity? (Leiden/Boston:
Brill, 2014) 295–341.
23 Gunnar Beck, The Legal Reasoning of the Court of Justice of the EU (Oxford: Hart Publishing,
2013) at 287–33.
24 Ibid 286.
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liberally cites its own previous decisions and does so at least as frequently as
other higher courts.25
Does this mean that the Court of Justice is not very different from other
courts, and that uncertainty in its decision making is no greater than in other
legal systems or, to the extent that the Court’s decisions may be more uncertain,
that uncertainty above all reflects the greater conceptual uncertainty and perva-
sive norm collisions in the primary legal materials of EU law? Convenient as this
conclusion may seem to be to apologists of EU integration, it is simply not true.
Why? There are some features of the Court’s approach which are not apparent
in its reformulation of Article 31 VCLT, nor spelled out expressly elsewhere in
the Court’s extensive body of case law.
First, although the Court frequently refers to the wording, this, in itself,
establishes little. The Court does so in perfunctory manner and without exten-
sive discussion. Crucially, the Court’s respect for the wording of provisions is
subject to a critical proviso: compared to many other courts, the Court of Justice
is relatively more willing to give priority to teleological criteria over linguistic
criteria in cases where both types of arguments conflict and a teleological argu-
ment favours an integrationist outcome or, more rarely, supports an otherwise
politically convenient solution.26
Secondly, the Court of Justice rarely, if ever, uses historical arguments.27
Thirdly, the Court often implicitly and sometimes explicitly takes account of
meta-teleological criteria and not merely, as it suggests in Merck, teleological
considerations,28 which refer to the explicit ‘objects of the rules of which [a legal
provision] forms part’.29 This applies despite the fact that the Court rarely
expressly refers to the ‘ever closer union’ objective and only somewhat more
frequently to the ‘spirit of the Treaties’.30 In important cases, however, the idea
of ever further integration is almost always implicit, as it is inseparable from the
principles of the uniform application of Union law as well as the effectiveness of
Union law.31
Fourthly, as soon as the Court decides with implicit reference to ‘ever closer
union’ or the principles that favour an integrationist solution, that decision
effectively becomes a precedent. Because many important cases were decided
on meta-teleological considerations, understood to include those principles
which favour an expansive interpretation of the scope of Union law and of
the competences of the EU institutions, the body of precedents itself acquires
25 Ibid 234–77.
26 Ibid 280–317.
27 Ibid 217–19.
28 For an elaboration on the ‘meta-teleological’ approach followed by the Court, with particular
focus on asylum cases, see Moreno-Lax (n 22) and references therein.
29 Case C-292/82 Merck v Hauptzollamt Hamburg-Jonas [1983] ECR-3781 at para. 12.
30 Beck (n 23), 319–22; VaughneMiller, House of Commons Library, BRIEFING PAPERNumber
07230, 16 November 2015 ‘Ever Closer Union’ in the EU Treaties and Court of Justice case law.
31 Ibid 320–21.
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a communautaire or pro-Union flavour. The importance of de facto precedents in
the Court’s argumentation is borne out by the fact that there is hardly any case
in which the Court does not refer to at least one previous decision. In both 1999
and 2011 there were more cases in which it cited case law than any classical
interpretative argument.32 In referring back to its case law, the Court thus
implicitly also relies on meta-teleological considerations. Precedents thus solidify
and reinforce the Court’s communautaire leaning. Moreover, the appeal to pre-
vious decisions enhances judicial credibility and lends later decisions the aura of
legal objectivity, simply because, in analysing a case, not every relevant previous
case is excavated and subjected to legal analysis.33
Fifthly, the Court of Justice operates in an extremely permissive political
environment. In domestic legal systems, it is open to the legislator to override
court decisions by passing appropriate legislation. Judgments by the Court of
Justice, by contrast, can be reversed only by the Court itself or by unanimous
treaty amendment by the Member States which, in all cases which affect or, as
the Court would say, ‘clarify’ the balance of powers between the EU and its
Member States, requires unanimity amongst all Member States. In other words,
it is as difficult to reverse a Court of Justice judgment as it is to amend the
existing Treaties. Moreover, the meaning of the Treaties, although not their
wording, invariably reflects, and thus evolves, with ongoing Court judgments.
The CJEU’s decision making, in turn, then builds not on the treaty text itself
but on its own body of interpretative decisions. The Court of Justice interprets
the Treaties as living, not historical instruments.34
Sixthly, in contrast with several other courts applying the VCLT, the Court of
Justice in considering literal, purposive, and other criteria, does not accept a
hierarchy amongst these criteria.35 The CJEU does not attach a clear consistent
weight to specific criteria. It presents its conclusion as the cumulative result of
the variable application of all criteria. The Court’s approach to legal reasoning
may therefore be described either as a cumulative or variable approach.36
32 Ibid 290–1.
33 Ibid 245–49.
34 Beck (n 23), 317–19.
35 Ibid 280–93, 316–17; KPE Lasok and Timothy Millett, Judicial Control in the EU (Richmond:
Richmond Law & Tax Ltd, 2004) at 375–91.
36 There are different understandings of the term ‘cumulative approach’. Here it means that the
CJEU presents it decisions in terms of the cumulative weight of literal, systemic, teleological and,
often, meta-teleological considerations, with the specific weight attached to each criterion varying
from one case to the next. For this reason, the author also refers to this approach as ‘variable’. See
further, Beck (n 23), 280–93; Cf. Violeta Moreno-Lax, ‘Systematising Systemic Integration: “War
Refugees", Regime Relations, and a Proposal for a Cumulative Approach to International
Commitments’ (2014) 12 Journal of International Criminal Justice 907–29, analysing the interpret-
ative methodology of the CJEU in Case C-285/12 Diakite´ ECLI:EU:C:2014:39 and related case law,
drawing on Art. 31(3)(c) VCLT and using ‘cumulative’ to denote also the outcome of the interpret-
ative operation in cases of concurrent obligations.
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Finally, the Court’s variable or cumulative approach combined with its meta-
teleological dimension gives the Court’s decision making its distinctive pro-
Union of communautaire tendency; its predisposition to resolve legal uncertainty
in favour of further integration of the Union’s interests.
The Court’s communautaire predisposition tends to be irrelevant in most
run-of-the-mill cases, which concern the application of more or less clear,
detailed, and technical provisions. Examples of these are mostly agriculture,
VAT, Customs Union, and Tariff cases. Unsurprisingly, in these areas the
Court generally pays close regard to the wording of the applicable provi-
sions, and it is exceptional for the Court to reach a conclusion based on
teleological criteria, which are opposed to a literal reading. However, the
Court’s pro-Union default position becomes crucial and often the decisive
factor in cases involving major issues of principle, such as constitutional
issues or the division of competences between the EU and Member
States. In constitutional cases the communautaire tendency inclines the
Court to resolve legal uncertainty in favour of meta-teleological objectives,
especially the ‘ever closer union’ objective which, implicitly, is present in
many of the Court’s most influential decisions. The Court in such cases may
disregard the lex specialis principle and override a more or less specific rule in
a particular policy area, which may suggest a less integrationist outcome, in
favour of a meta-teleological reading, based not on the ‘objects of the rules of
which [the rule] forms part’37 but the general aspirations of the Union
Treaties.
At the same time, it should be added, the Court’s communautaire predis-
position is just that, a tendency, not an inevitable or foregone conclusion. The
Court of Justice is, in fact, a politically most astute court. Where Member
States’ political or budgetary sensitivities are engaged, the Court frequently
adopts a compromise solution which may involve deferring to the Member
States concerned, either on the facts or in law, or most commonly with refer-
ence to the flexible proportionality principle, which involves minimal con-
straints for future decisions and leaves the Court’s future discretion largely
untouched.38
The Court of Justice’s pro-Union interpretative stance is evident in most of its
decisions determining the scope of Union law and the division of competences
between national and Union law, in a number of key cases widening and
entrenching the scope of EU citizenship law and in its judicial response to the
euro crisis.
37 Case C-292/82 Merck v Hauptzollamt Hamburg-Jonas [1983] ECR-3781, para. 12.
38 Beck (n 23), 404–9.
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V. The early constitutional cases
In its early grand constitutional cases from van Gend,39 Costa,40 the
Internationale Handelsgesellschaft,41 Nold,42 through to Francovich,43 the Court
was presented with a legal question to which the Treaty provided no compelling
answer: it reached an integrationist outcome without textual support, in defiance
of established public international law, yet not quite openly in opposition to the
text.44 In these cases, the Court filled the ‘gaps’ left by the signatory Member
States. ‘Gap-filling’ together with a readiness to adopt a more teleological, rather
than textual approach is one of the key features of an activist court. Where, in
addition, such a court does not approach each case de novo, but in the light of
both the text, its purposes, and its own previous decisions, judicial decisions,
especially where they are relevant to the legal order as a whole, reinforce the
existing direction and, in general terms, tend to move the judicial decision-
making process further down the same road. This phenomenon characterizes
the evolution of EU law: the principles established in the CJEU’s principal
‘constitutional’ cases quickly became part of the foundation of EU law and
have been cited or, commonly simply applied without express reference in
many subsequent key cases where they have had the effect of tilting the balance
generally in favour of an integrationist outcome. With each subsequent commu-
nautaire decision, the body of precedents became a degree more integrationist—
the goalposts were shifted.45 The CJEU’s case law on the scope and content of
39 Case C-26/62 NV Algemene Transport- en Expeditie Onderneming van Gend & Loos v Netherlands
Inland Revenue Administration [1963] ECR-1.
40 Case C-6/64 Flaminio Costa v ENEL [1964] ECR-585.
41 Case C-11/70 Internationale Handelsgesellschaft mbH v Einfuhr- und Vorratsstelle fu¨r Getreide und
Futtermittel [1970] ECR-114.
42 Case C-4/73 J. Nold, Kohlen- und Baustoffgroßhandlung v Ruhrkohle Aktiengesellschaft [1975]
ECR-985.
43 Case C-6/90 Andrea Francovich and Danila Bonifaci and others v Italian Republic [1991] ECR-
428. InCosta v ENEL the Court of Justice justified the supremacy of EU over national law in terms of
a meta-teleological reading of the Treaty (the aspirational grand meta-objective of ‘ever closer union’)
which, ultimately, can be used to justify any integrationist conclusion provided Member States
politically accept it. In the Internationale Handelsgesellschaft case the Court reiterated and extended
its conclusion by additional reference to the principle of the uniform application of EU law, which it
uses whenever the Treaties themselves provide inadequate textual support or are silent. And in
Francovich the Court imposed liability in damages on Member States for breaches of Union law,
esp. in implementation cases, again without a textual basis and by reference to the principles of
effectiveness and the uniform application of Union law.
44 It brushed aside such counter-arguments with the argument that the EU legal order is sui
generis—which may be plausible but has no express treaty basis.
45 Another case where the Court clearly made law in the absence of any treaty basis for the pro-
tection of fundamental rights in the EC treaty is Nold v Commission (Case C-4/73) Despite the
absence of any treaty provision clarifying the status of national constitutional law and rights guar-
antees under them, the Court held that ‘fundamental rights form an integral part of the general
principles of law, the observance of which it ensures’. The conclusion might be appealing but in
reaching it the ECJ did not, and could not, appeal to any basis in the EC Treaty, it simply made law
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EU citizenship rights provides a good example of the cumulative integrationist
effect of a few cardinal initial judicial choices.
VI. EU citizenship cases
In many EU citizenship cases, however, the Court also goes one step further: it
expands the right to financial and other benefits of moving EU citizens in the
absence of Treaty support and, in addition, in defiance of the principle of
conferral and in opposition to detailed provisions of the applicable secondary
legislation. This is evident from the following examples.
Economically active EU migrant citizens, notably EU migrant workers, have
long enjoyed an equal right to in-work and contributions-based benefits on par
with domestic workers, which derives from the free movement of persons pro-
visions of the EU Treaties in connection with the prohibition of discrimination
on grounds of nationality.46 EU legislation adopted under the relevant treaty
provisions47 provides for a more specific framework in this area, which operates
as an exception, governing work-related economic and social benefits for eco-
nomically active EU citizens and their family members, to the general social
policy prerogative of Member States.
In contrast, neither the EU Treaties nor the relevant EU legislation provide a
textual basis for such a general exception in favour of economically inactive
citizens and their family members.48 Article 18 TFEU moreover limits the
operation of the non-discrimination principle to those areas of law which fall
within the scope of the EU’s competences under the Treaties. The Treaties do
not empower the EU to adopt legislation governing benefits entitlements to EU
migrants who are not workers or ex-workers. Nor does Title X TFEU49 include
rules governing benefits entitlements for economically inactive EU citizens as
falling within the list of social policy fields where the Union has a supporting or
supplementary competence to support the policies of the Member States.50
Where the Treaties do not confer legislative competence, legislative powers
remain with the Member States. It follows that, in contrast to in-work benefits,
benefits entitlements for economically inactive EU migrants fall outside the
by deciding the general principles of Community law also extended to the protection of fundamental
rights under national law—there was no basis for it until the treaty revisions of the 1990s.
46 See Art. 18 TFEU, Art. 21 TFEU, and Art. 45(2) TFEU (ex Article 39 TEC). Art. 45(2)
prohibits any discrimination on grounds of nationality between home and EU migrant workers in
relation to remuneration and other work conditions.
47 Regulation (EU) No 492/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 5 April 2011
on freedom of movement for workers within the Union [2011] OJ L 141.
48 Art. 24(2) of Directive 2004/38/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April
2004 on the right of citizens of the Union and their family members to move and reside freely within
the territory of the Member States, [2004] OJ L 158.
49 Arts 151 to 161 TFEU.
50 See Art. 153 TFEU.
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scope of the non-discrimination principle. Where EU citizens leave their home
country and enter another EU Member State without employment or adequate
financial resources, the EU Treaties, according to the ordinary meaning of the
words used, do not confer a right to social assistance in the host state. The
adoption of Directive 2004/3851 has not changed the pre-2004 distribution of
competences, nor could it in the absence of a treaty change.
The entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty in 2009, likewise did not extend the
Union’s powers in this area. Instead, and in contradistinction to the treaty rights
of workers and ex-workers and their family members, Directive 2004/38 states
that EU citizens who are not ‘workers or self-employed persons in the host
Member States’ only have a right to residence in another EU Member State
for more than three months if they ‘have sufficient resources for themselves and
their family members not to become a burden on the social assistance system of
the host Member State during their period of residence and have comprehensive
sickness insurance cover in the host Member State’.52
The ‘sufficient resources’ requirement does not apply to EU migrants who
have acquired the right to permanent residence, who entered as workers, or who
after a minimum period of employment become unemployed. It is likewise
qualified with regard to retired workers who wish to remain in the host
Member State.53 Article 24(1) of the Directive further states that Union citizens
‘shall enjoy equal treatment with the nationals of that Member State [only]
within the scope of the Treaty’. This provision, which echoes similar provisions
in the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights,54 means that any rights conferred
under the Directive must not be construed as extending the boundaries of EU
law or redefining the division of competences between Member States and the
Union. Article 24(2) specifically provides that ‘the host Member State shall not
be obliged to confer entitlement to social assistance . . . , nor shall it be obliged,
prior to acquisition of the right of permanent residence, to grant maintenance
aid for studies, including vocational training, consisting in student grants or
student loans to persons other than workers, self-employed persons, persons
who retain such status and members of their families’.
Notwithstanding the restrictive provisions of Directive 2004/38 and the gen-
eral social policy competence of the Member State, the CJEU, in a series of
seminal cases, nevertheless extended the right to social assistance to various
groups of economically inactive Union citizens. The Court also adopted an
expansive construction of the concept of Union citizenship and its rights in
other less high-profile areas of law, which do not fall within the competences of
the Union institutions, such as national laws governing the family names.
51 (n 49).
52 Art. 7, Directive 2004/38.
53 Art. 17, Directive 2004/38.
54 Art. 51, Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union [2010] OJ C 83/389.
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In Grzelczyk,55 a pre-2004 case, the Court was asked to decide if the appli-
cant, a French student, was entitled to a ‘minimex’ maintenance grant while
studying in Belgium. National law laid down that only Belgian nationals were
entitled to the minimex. In consequence, the Court stated that ‘a student of
Belgian nationality . . . who found himself in exactly the same circumstances as
Mr Grzelczyk would satisfy the conditions for obtaining the minimex. The fact
that Mr Grzelczyk is not of Belgian nationality is the only bar to its being
granted to him’. However, the Court went on to opine that ‘Union citizenship
is destined to become the fundamental status of nationals of the Member States
enabling those who find themselves in the same situation to enjoy the same
treatment in law irrespective of their nationality, subject to such exceptions as
are expressly provided for’.56 Furthermore, the Court held that Union law ‘ac-
cepts a certain degree of financial solidarity between nationals of a host Member
State and nationals of other Member States’.57 On those grounds, the CJEU
concluded, the minimex could not be denied.
The Court’s decision may be morally attractive. However, Articles 18 and 21
TFEU refer to the ‘scope of application of EU law’ and thus restrict the application
of the equal treatment principles to those areas where the Union has legislative
competence as provided for in Articles 3, 4, and 6 TFEU including derogations
from EU law.58 The Union enjoys such shared legislative competence in social
policy matters only in so far as it falls within the scope of the Treaty. Non-work
related social assistance and financial support for students do not fall into this area.
Accordingly, neither the equal treatment nor the proportionality principle should
have been invoked to impose constraints on Member State social policy choices.
In Grzelczyk, the CJEU implicitly extended the competences of the Union
legislator. The Court affirmed the decision in Grzelczyk in the later cases of
D’Hoop59 and in Ioannidis60 where, following the adoption of Directive 2004/
38, the CJEU also confirmed that foreign-schooled job-seekers had the right to
the Belgian allowance, notwithstanding domestic legislation that Belgian na-
tionals had to meet certain residence requirements before qualifying for the
minimex allowance. The CJEU applied the same reasoning in Bidar,61 where
55 Case C-184/99 Rudy Grzelczyk v Centre public d’aide sociale d’Ottignies-Louvain-la-Neuve [2001]
ECR I-6193.
56 Ibid para. 31.
57 Ibid para. 24.
58 In this line, defending an approach that aligns ‘the scope of application of EU law’ with the
sphere of EU competences, see Opinion of AG Sharpston in Case C-34/09 Zambrano [2011] ECR I-
1177, delivered on 30 September 2010, ECLI:EU:C:2010:560. For an alternative view and detailed
analysis, see Violeta Moreno-Lax and Cathryn Costello, ‘The Extraterritorial Application of the
Charter: From Territoriality to Facticity, the Effectiveness Model’, in S Peers and others (eds), The
EU Charter of Fundamental Rights: A Commentary (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2014) 1657–83.
59 Case C-224/98 Marie-Nathalie D’Hoop v Office national de l’emploi [2002] ECR I-6191.
60 Case C-258/04 Office national de l’emploi v Ioannis Ioannidis [2005] ECR I-08275.
61 Case C-209/03 The Queen, on the application of Dany Bidar v London Borough of Ealing and
Secretary of State for Education and Skills [2005] ECR I-2119.
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it held that, notwithstanding a residence requirement under national law, a
migrant student who does not meet that requirement, might qualify for a
subsidised student loan in the host state if, in view of other factors, the resultant
exclusion is disproportionate. Bidar and Ioannidis were decided after adoption of
Directive 2004/38, which limits the right to free movement of economically
inactive EU citizens to workers and those with sufficient resources to maintain
themselves. The CJEU disregarded this provision and instead justified its con-
clusions by analogical reference to the underlying rationale established in its
previous decisions, including Grzelczyk and D’Hoop. The latter cases had been
under the pre-Directive 2004/38 Treaty framework, which confers Union com-
petence only in the field of in-work benefits and, by implication, leaves legis-
lation governing social assistance to economically inactive or non self-sufficient
EU migrants to the Member States.62
The CJEU has followed a similarly expansive, integrationist approach to the
application of the equal treatment principle in the field of differential tax treat-
ment for national and non-national pensioners. The decision in Ru¨ffler63 is
morally appealing, but, although it does not directly conflict with Directive
2004/38, it is without treaty basis. In accordance with the principle of conferral,
62 The general tendency of the CJEU’s case law on EU citizenship has been expansive and, in its
results, extended the right of migrants to various forms of social assistance in their host state beyond
the ordinary meaning of Articles 18 and 21 TFEU and the rights conferred in Directive 2004/38.
This tendency, however, has not been universal. See for instance, Case C-333/13 Elisabeta Dano
[2014] ECR-2358 and Case 67/14 Jobcenter Berlin Neuko¨lln v Nazifa Alimanovic [2015] ECR I-597.
In the wake of the financial crisis and increasing concern in a number of Member States about so-
called ‘benefits tourism’ the CJEU, in both cases, appears to revive the link between the right of EU
migrants to certain non-contributory social benefits and lawful residency in the host member state in
specific factual circumstances. However, the Court did not overrule its earlier expansive case law. The
restrictive approach adopted in Dano and Alimanovic should not therefore be interpreted as a reversal
in the Court’s general approach, but above all as an astute ‘political response’ to worsening economic
conditions and growing euro-scepticism in some Member States, which may be reversed again in
future. Case C-308/14 Commission v United Kingdom [2016] ECR I-436 provides an even more
poignant example of politically astute judicial fine-tuning: the Court decided that the UK can require
recipients of child benefit and child tax credit to have a right to reside in the UK. Although that
condition is considered to amount to indirect indiscrimination, it was justified by the need to protect
the finances of the host Member State. In no previous case had the CJEU upheld a plea by a Member
State of justification of indirect indiscrimination against nationals of other Member States based on
the ‘need to protect the finances of the host Member State’ in the absence of clear evidence that the
payment of such payments posed a serious threat to the public finances in the host state. In
Commission v United Kingdom the CJEU did precisely that. It is difficult to resist the conclusion
that the decision was not uninfluenced by the timing of the British referendum on EUmembership,
to be held on 23 June nine days after the Court published its judgment, and by widespread concern
within the electorate that the Court of Justice had, step-by-step, undermined the right of Member
States to restrict benefits payments to EU migrants in accordance with Directive 2004/38 and the
restrictions placed on the application of the equal treatment principle by Articles 18 and 21 TFEU.
63 Case C-544/07 Uwe Ru¨ffler v Dyrektor Izby Skarbowej we Wroclawiu Os´rodek Zamiejscowy w
Walbrzychu [2009] ECR I-3389.
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legislative powers which are not transferred to the Union remain with the
Member States. The Court of Justice’s decision in Ru¨ffler thus impliedly extends
the competences of the Union. In this line, the Court of Justice’s application of
the equal treatment principle to different rules for nationals and EU migrants in
relation to post-bankcruptcy debt relief in Radziejewski64 encroaches on the
powers of the Member States for exactly the same reason.
Further examples of judicial integrationism can be found in areas other than
social or welfare policy, such as national rules governing the registration of
surnames.65 Again, in the circumstances the decisions appear humane, yet the
EU Treaties do not confer any competence on the EU institutions in the field of
national rules governing the registration of surnames. The equal treatment le-
gislation consequently does not apply. National legislation, outside the legisla-
tive competences of the EU, falls outside the ratione materiae of Union law and
the CJEU does not have a general human rights jurisdiction in matters of
national law. Equally, the protection against expulsion under EU law for
family members of EU citizens is confined to cross-border situations, that is,
to EU citizens and their family members who have moved from one Member
State to another. It does govern wholly internal situations in one Member State
where the EU citizen, from whom the rights of his family members derive, has
not exercised his freedom of movement. In Zambrano, however, the Court held
that Article 20 TFEU precluded the expulsion of family members of an EU
citizen who had never exercised his freedom of movement.66 In all but name,
the CJEU again arrogated a general human rights jurisdiction to itself, for which
the Treaties provide no basis.
VII. The CJEU’s euro crisis decisions
Nowhere, however, is the Court’s pro-Union bias more evident than in the
litigation which has arisen out of the euro crisis. Here the Court takes the
64 Case C-461/11 Ulf Kazimierz Radziejewski v Kronofogdemyndigheten i Stockholm,
ECLI:EU:C:2012:704.
65 See Case C-148/02 Carlos Garcia Avello v Belgian State [2003] ECR-I-11613; Case C-353/06
Stefan Grunkin and Dorothee Regina Paul [2008] ECR I-07639. Cf. Case C–208/09 Sayn-
Wittgenstein [2010] ECR I–13693 in which the CJEU qualified but did not reverse its step-by-
step erosion of the national prerogative over the law of surnames when it held that Member States
retain that prerogative even in cross-border situations if the person affected changed her name to
circumvent national constitutional rules abolishing titles of nobility.
66 C-34/09 Gerardo Ruiz Zambrano v Office national de l’emploi (ONEm) [2011] ECRI-01177.
The CJEU’s effective ultra vires reading of the scope of the EU’s non-discrimination powers has been
qualified to some extent in the subsequent decision in Case C-256/11 Dereci v Bundesministerium fur
Inneres [2011] ECR I-11315. However, it is held that Dereci does not represent a general reversal of
the CJEU’s expansive reading of its fundamental rights jurisdiction. See for instance Case C-310/08
London Borough of Harrow v Nimco Hassan Ibrahim, Secretary of State for the Home Department
[2010] ECR I-01065; and Joined Cases C-356/11 and C-357/11 O, S v Maahanmuuttovirasto, L
ECLI:EU:C:2012:776.
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crucial step from law-making to law-breaking: it decides one way, when the
Treaty says otherwise. The term ‘law-breaking’ is, of course, rarely used in
academic literature and least of all with regard to courts or judges. The more
common term would be mis-application of the law by judges. By law-breaking
here are meant situations where a court adopts an argumentation that imposes
minimal methodological constraint and maximizes judicial discretion over when
and where to rely on which type of interpretative criteria in preference to others
without. It equally applies to situations where putative literal arguments do not
reflect the ordinary meaning of the terms of the relevant provision, or when a
court adopts a teleological interpretation at variance with the ordinary meaning
of the treaty, which is supported by historical evidence about the intention of the
parties and does not lead to absurd, but simply a politically or economically
inconvenient result, or one that threatens important and influential business and
financial interests.
The first patently integrationist and political decision is Pringle.67 Before
turning to the judgment, a few words must be said about the nature of the
EU’s monetary union. The European single currency, known as the euro, was
established with the Treaty of Maastricht, which was adopted in 1993.68 The
Maastricht Treaty,69 however, bases monetary union on the basis of the principle
of individual national budgetary responsibility. This means that, although
Member States agreed to a common monetary policy to be conducted by the
European Central Bank (ECB), they would remain responsible for the manage-
ment of their own public debt levels which, inter alia, are influenced by the
interest rate and other policies of the ECB. To ensure responsible financial
management by Member States, a no bailout clause was inserted in the
Treaties. This is Article 125 TFEU, which states that
[t]he Union shall not be liable for or assume the commitments of central governments,
regional, local or other public authorities, other bodies governed by public law, or
public undertakings of any Member State, without prejudice to mutual financial guar-
antees for the joint execution of a specific project. A Member State shall not be liable for
or assume the commitments of central governments, regional, local or other public autho-
rities, other bodies governed by public law, or public undertakings of another Member
State, without prejudice to mutual financial guarantees for the joint execution of a
specific project. (emphasis added)
67 The decision handed down in November 2012. Pringle submitted that Decision 2011/199
establishing the ESM, was inconsistent with Art. 125 TFEU. Art. 125 states that neither ‘the
Union institutions’ nor ‘a Member State’ shall ‘assume the commitments of central governments,
regional, local or other public authorities, other bodies governed by public law, or public under-
takings of another Member State.’ The Court dismissed the applicant’s argument and upheld the
compatibility of Decision 2011/199 with Art. 125 TFEU on two key grounds.
68 The Treaty on European Union (TEU), signed in Maastricht on 7 February 1992, entered into
force on 1 November 1993 [1992] OJ C 191.
69 Art. 104b.
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To those who can read, Article 125 TFEU is as clear as legal provisions can be:
there is to be no mutual financial assistance between Eurozone governments,
except for very specific projects limited in scope. However, in the wake of the
euro crisis, Euro governments very quickly began to ignore the no-bail clause,
and in 2012 instituted a permanent bailout fund, the so-called European
Stability Mechanism (ESM), with a total volume of E500bn and, including
other funds, of E700bn.
In the Pringle case, the CJEU was asked to assess the compatibility of the ESM
with Article 125 TFEU, the so-called no-bail out fund. The Court upheld the
legality of the permanent rescue fund, essentially on two grounds. First, the CJEU
resorted to a disingenuous, indeed deceptive literal argument: mutual financial
assistance between two or more Eurozone countries, via the establishment of a
rescue fund, and the assumption of existing debts of one such country by one or
more other Eurozone members are two entirely different things, because ‘assist-
ance (via a rescue fund) amounts to the creation of a new debt, owed to the ESM
by that recipient Member State, which remains responsible for its commitments
to its creditors in respect of its existing debts’.70 In other words, the ‘no bailout’
clause does not forbid assistance given through an intermediary.
In essence, the Court here confines Article 125 TFEU to cases where the
existing debt of one country is assigned to another Member State, so that that
state steps into the shoes of the original debtor and assumes legal liability for its
pre-existing debt. Any other form of mutual financial assistance involving a
transfer of the default risk from the original debtor to the assisting state(s),
but without a formal assignation of one and the same debt, the Court of
Justice in effect maintains, is outside the scope of the ‘no-bail out’ clause. If,
as the Court evidently concludes, Article 125 TFEU was never intended to
prevent the transfer of financial risk between Eurozone governments, then the
so-called ‘“no-bail out” clause’ does little or nothing to restrict the mutualization
of debt within the Eurozone.
Not only is it unprecedented for the CJEU to rely on an extreme and, as has
been shown, specious literal interpretation which, at the same time, effectively
reduces a central Treaty provision to absurdity/redundancy. The Court’s sup-
posed literal interpretation even fails on its own terms. Article 125 TFEU, on a
literal interpretation is not restricted to direct bailouts between states. The words
‘shall not be liable or assume’ cover situations where the default of one country
triggers a legally binding promise of support by another, though the resulting
obligation may be legally distinct. Moreover, under the ESM Treaty,71 Eurozone
members guarantee loans and guarantees given by the ESM, according to a
contribution formula equivalent to their shares in the capital of the European
Central Bank. However, if one Eurozone member is unable to honour its
70 Ibid., para. 139.
71 Treaty establishing the European Stability Mechanism (ESM), [2011] OJ L 91, p. 1.
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commitments, then, according to Article 25 ESM Treaty, it falls to the remain-
ing ESM members to assume the shortfall.72 They thus assume the commit-
ments of the failing Member State—precisely the ‘assumption of liability’
which, even on the Court of Justice’s view, is prohibited by Article 125
TFEU. The supposedly literal interpretation of Article 125 TFEU patently
conflicts with an equally literal interpretation of the ESM Treaty.
Secondly, the difficulties associated with the Court’s only apparently literal
interpretation may explain why the Court also refers to ‘the preparatory work
relating to the Treaty of Maastricht’ which, it states, discloses ‘that the aim of
Article 125 TFEU is to ensure that the Member States follow a sound budgetary
policy?’.73 The ESM, the Court continues, takes account of this objective in that
it links the award of financial assistance to ‘strict conditionality . . . [designed to]
ensure that the Member States pursue a sound budgetary policy’.74 The ESM,
the Court thus concludes, complies with Article 125 TFEU, as it ‘ensures that
the Member States remain subject to the logic of the market when they enter
into debt, since that ought to prompt them to maintain budgetary discipline.
Compliance with such discipline contributes at Union level to the attainment of
a higher objective, namely maintaining the financial stability of the monetary
union’.75
It should be noted that Article 125 TFEU has one obvious aim—to prevent
mutual financial assistance—and that aim is clearly set out. That aim admit-
tedly, in turn, is designed to ensure a sound monetary policy, just as any im-
mediate aim usually has another more long-term objective. Yet, in invoking that
further goal, what the Court ignores is that the EU Treaties make a very clear
choice as to how ‘sound budgetary policy’ is to be achieved, which is apparent
from the wording of Articles 123, 125, and 127 TFEU—that budgetary dis-
cipline was to be achieved not through the mutualization of debt, but via in-
dividual national responsibility for public debt.
The outcome in Pringle came as no surprise either to judicial commentators,
politicians or the financial markets. The Court essentially upheld a done polit-
ical deal.76 To give this convenient conclusion at least the semblance of legal
72 Art. 25(2) ESM Treaty.
73 Ibid para. 135.
74 Ibid para. 143.
75 Ibid para. 135. The Court held that is that ‘strict conditionality’ ensures Member States remain
subject to the market. That confidence seems surprising in view of the fact that a previous interna-
tional agreement entered into by Member States, namely the Stability and Growth Pact, has been
broken since its inception on a year-on-year basis by an average of two-thirds of the Eurozone
Member States. That pact did nothing to ensure the observance of precisely that ‘sound budgetary
policy’ which the Court now so confidently expects the ESM agreement to promote, in the absence, it
should be noted, of any additional Treaty safeguards such as a substantially enhanced Treaty en-
forcement mechanism or new legal guarantees and sanctions against non-compliant states backed up
by full Treaty recognition in Union law.
76 Under the ESM Treaty Member States whose currency is the euro, guarantee the loans and
guarantees given by the ESM according to a contribution key determined by the share each holds in
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credibility, the Court relies on two types of arguments it usually employs only
extremely rarely: a putative literal argument, which is both at variance with the
ordinary meaning of Article 125 TFEU and Article 25 ESM Treaty, and thus is
no literal argument at all. Second, it refers to the preparatory works as support
for its teleological reading—something it practically never does, as the Court
commonly chooses to present the Treaties as evolving and not as historical
documents to be interpreted with the subjective intention of the signatories77
As regards the Court’s teleological argument, that argument both conflicts with
the textual choice that sound budgetary policy is to be achieved through self-
reliance, not mutual assistance, and it runs counter to basic economic theory
and empirical psychological evidence that the mutualization of debt reduces,
rather than enhances incentives for budgetary discipline.
The more convincing construction of the rationale of Article 125 TFEU, it is
submitted, would have been an ordinary language reading, according to which
‘the assumption of the commitments’ of one Member State by another would
have been taken to refer to, and strictly prohibit, any de facto transfer of the
financial risk of public debt between Member States, save where expressly pro-
vided for in the Treaties and strictly limited to the purposes of those exceptional
provisions.
An equally overtly political and integrationist decision by the CJEU in defi-
ance of the Treaty is the 2015 Gauweiler judgment.78 In Gauweiler, the Court
had to consider whether the European Central Bank’s first unlimited govern-
ment bond buy programme, the so-called OMT, fell within the ECB’s mandate.
Under the Treaties, the ECB may only conduct monetary policy, whilst eco-
nomic policy is the prerogative of the Member States. The EU institutions may
support the economic policies of the Member States, but the ECB must not
stray from its Treaty objective, which is to combat inflation and ensure price
stability. The key issues in Gauweiler were: first, are unlimited government bond
buys a lawful monetary policy instrument under the EU Treaties? And, secondly,
do the EU Treaties authorize the ECB to conduct monetary policy aimed at
‘safeguarding an appropriate monetary policy transmission and the singleness of
the monetary policy’. The Court held, first, that bond buys were monetary
policy and thus part of the ECB’s mandate and that, for those reasons, ‘safe-
guarding an appropriate monetary policy transmission and the singleness of the
monetary policy’ was a legitimate monetary policy objective. The Court here
not only effectively amended the Treaties, which confine the ECB’s monetary
the capital of the European Central Bank, if one Eurozone member is unable to honour its share of
commitments.
77 See, for instance, Beck (n 23), at 280–91; Hjalte Rasmussen, The European Court of Justice
(Copenhagen: GadJura, 1998). Oreste Pollicino, ‘Legal Reasoning of the Court of Justice in the
Context of the Principle of Equality Between Judicial Activism and Self-restraint’ (2004) 5(3)
German Law Journal, at 283–317, especially 284–5 and 317.
78 Case C-62/14 Gauweiler and Others ECLI:EU:C:2015:7.
Beck506
policy to the pursuit of price stability and, subject to that overriding objective,
to specific foreign exchange and payment systems operations, but it also took the
ECB’s declared aims at their face value, when it held that the nature of a policy
measure is to be assessed primarily by reference to its objectives and not its
substance nor its effects. In Pringle, the Court had held that bond buys by the
ESM ‘to preserve the stability of the euro’ were economic, not monetary policy.
In Gauweiler, it decided that, when the ECB buys bonds for an allegedly dif-
ferent purpose, bond buys become monetary policy just because, and for no
other reason that, the ECB buys the bonds and states that it does so for a
different objective. The Court’s argumentation not only ignores the Treaty
text, but contradicts its own previous decisions according to which the aim of
EU acts is to be determined objectively, not subjectively.79
On the first issue, the CJEU’s conclusion that, depending on their objective,
bond buys may be a legitimate monetary policy measure, does not only sit
uneasily with the view reached in Pringle, that purchases of government debt
securities represent an economic policy instrument aimed at ensuring the sur-
vival of the euro, It also ignores the fact that Article 123 TFEU does not only
prohibit monetary financing of euro governments by the ECB by means of
direct bond buys from the issuing public bodies,80 but that recital (7) of
Council Regulation 3603/9381 extends the prohibition of monetary financing
of government debt to ‘purchases made on the secondary market’, which may
have the effect ‘to circumvent the objective of that Article’. Recital (8) of the
Regulation lends additional support to a broad and very strict construction of
the prohibition of monetary financing and states that neither the ECB nor the
European System of Central Banks may engage in purchases ‘of marketable debt
instruments’ issued by a Eurozone Member State which may, in any way, ‘help
to shield the public sector from the discipline of market mechanisms’. In
Gauweiler, the CJEU not only simply ignored Council Regulation 3603/93 in
its entirely, it also conveniently ignored the fact that, in Pringle, it had accepted
79 Case C-376/98 Germany v Parliament and Council [2000] ECR I-8419, para. 85; see also Case
C-350/92 Spain v Council [1995] ECR I-1985, paras 2541; Case C-233/94 Germany v Parliament
and Council [1997] ECR I-2405, paras 1021; Case C-220/14 P Ezz v Council and Commission,
ECLI:EU:C:2015:147, para. 42.
80 Article 123 TFEU:
1. Overdraft facilities or any other type of credit facility with the European Central Bank or with
the central banks of the Member States (hereinafter referred to as ‘national central banks’) in
favour of Union institutions, bodies, offices or agencies, central governments, regional, local
or other public authorities, other bodies governed by public law, or public undertakings of
Member States shall be prohibited, as shall the purchase directly from them by the European
Central Bank or national central banks of debt instruments.
2. Paragraph 1 shall not apply to publicly owned credit institutions which, in the context of the
supply of reserves by central banks, shall be given the same treatment by national central banks
and the European Central Bank as private credit institutions.
81 Council Regulation (EC) No 3603/93 of 13 December 1993 specifying definitions for the appli-
cation of the prohibitions referred to in Arts 104 and 104b (1) of the Treaty [1993] OJ L 332/1.
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that limited bond buys by the ESM are an appropriate and legitimate economic
policy instrument to allow Eurozone Member States to roll over and issue
government debt instruments at a cost below the market rate.
Economic and monetary policy, however, are conventionally distinguished by
reference, inter alia, to the instruments they respectively employ. Moreover, un-
limited bond buys by the Central Bank have inevitably the same effect, by
increasing demand and distorting the private investor market, as bond buys by
another body, and that effect is inevitably greater if the ECB’s bond buys are in
principle unlimited—in contrast to the ESM, which operates under the constraint
of overall credit limits. Gauweiler was decided nearly five months after the ECB
had launched a quantitative easing bond-buying programme and nearly three
years after the announcement of the OMT. At the time of the Gauweiler judg-
ment, the economic effects of the ECB’s bond-buying programme had become
obvious. Both the announcement of the programmes and the commencement of
the purchases had resulted in substantial declines in risk premiums and the inter-
est on newly issued Eurozone bonds. This is precisely the type of monetary
financing of public debt which Article 123 TFEU and Regulation 3603/93 pro-
hibit. The CJEU, however, chose to uphold the ECB’s ‘unconventional’ monetary
policy in defiance of the economic evidence, as readily as the ordinary meaning of
recitals (7) and (8) of Council Regulation 3603/93.
The CJEU’s conclusion on the second principal issue, that is, of whether the
improvement of the transmission mechanism for the ECB’s monetary policy is a
legitimate monetary policy, likewise plainly disregards the Treaty. The EU
Treaties and the Statute of the ECB are clear on this point. The overriding
objective of monetary policy in the Eurozone is the maintenance of price sta-
bility,82 whilst the tasks of the ECB also include the carrying out of foreign
exchange operations, the management of foreign currency reserves, and the
maintenance of the payment systems within the Eurozone. The ECB’s declared
aim, in both the OMT and its subsequent Quantitative Easing programme of
improving the transmission mechanism for its monetary policy, has no treaty
basis. Moreover, market economies are not planned economies. In market
economies the central bank sets base interest rates and minimum reserve re-
quirements for commercial banks and carries out short-term open market for-
eign exchange and securities operations, but the transmission of these central
bank monetary ‘impulses’ is deliberately left to the market. Commercial banks
then determine interest rates and lending volumes to the corporate sector and
private households, and the interest rate and credit limits they set for loans to
individuals incorporate a variable risk premium, which reflects the default risks
of individual borrowers. The ECB’s attempt to interfere with the transmission
mechanism directly conflicts with the principle of an ‘open market economy’
according to Article 120 TFEU.
82 Art. 127(1) TFEU.
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Importantly, the CJEU’s conclusion that the improvement of the transmis-
sion mechanism represents a legitimate monetary policy objective not only
defies the Treaties, the reasoning behind it also runs counter to the Court’s
settled case law that the objective of an EU act is to be determined objectively,
not subjectively.83 In Gauweiler, the Court held that the nature of a measure—
that is, whether it is to be regarded as monetary or economic policy—is to be
assessed principally with reference to the declared or putative aims stated the
ECB, even if the measure ‘may have indirect effects’ which have nothing to do
with monetary policy.84 Previously, the CJEU had consistently held that to
determine the nature of an EU measure, primary regard must be had to its
objective effects, and that the subjective intention or declared objective of the
legislator or policy maker is not determinative, but only the starting point. In
particular, it had always insisted that ‘the Court must verify whether the measure
whose validity is at issue in fact pursues the objectives stated by the Community
legislature’.85 In Gauweiler, the CJEU engaged in no such assessement. It simply
conveniently ignored settled case law that, in determining the aim of a Union
measure, its effects cannot be ignored.
And, as for the declared aim of the OMT programme, the Treaty states that
the objective of the ECB is to secure price stability. The OMT, by contrast, is
not even aimed at price stability, but the transmission of monetary policy, the
so-called ‘singleness of monetary policy’ and, in all but name, the preservation of
the Euro.86 Neither aim has any basis in the Treaty. The measure is turned into
monetary policy just because the ECB says so. The ECB, according to the
CJEU, does not even have to justify its measures by reference to Treaty provi-
sions. Monetary policy, quite simply, is what the ECB says it is. It can thus do
anything, provided the Member States accept it.
In Pringle, the Court purported to rely on, but in fact dismissed, the wording
of Article 125 TFEU to justify mutual financial assistance by reference to an
implied purpose which is not even in the Treaties, that is, the stability of the
euro, thus discarding the more immediate purpose of preventing mutualization
of debt by Member States. And in Gauweiler, the ECJ took the view that the
nature of a measure may be determined by its subjective purpose and not ob-
jectively by due reference to its effects. Moreover, that subjective purpose may be
83 Case C-376/98 Germany v Parliament and Council [2000] ECR I-8419, para. 85; see also Case
C-350/92 Spain v Council [1995] ECR I-1985, paras 25–41; Case C-233/94 Germany v Parliament
and Council [1997] ECR I-2405, paras 10–21; Case C-220/14 P Ezz v Council and Commission,
ECLI:EU:C:2015:147, para. 42.
84 Gauweiler, para. 46. See also paras 47–52.
85 Case C-376/98 Germany v Parliament and Council, para. 85; see also Case C-350/92 Spain v
Council, paras 25–41; Case C-233/94 Germany v Parliament and Council, paras 10–21; Case C-220/
14 P Ezz v Council and Commission, para. 42; see further Case C-130/10 Parliament v Council, para.
42; C-453/03, C-11/04, C-12/04, and C-194/04, ABNA et al. v Secretary of State for Health et al.
[2005] ECR I-10423, para. 53.
86 ‘Technical features of Outright Monetary Transactions’, ECB Press Release, 6 September 2012.
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accepted, even if it is not contained in the Treaty, thus effectively freeing the
ECB from any judicial oversight.
Pringle and Gauweiler are two decisions which illustrate how far, in promot-
ing the goal of further EU integration, the CJEU is prepared to stretch the
methodological constraints on judicial decision making. In Pringle, the CJEU
overrides the natural meaning of Article 125 TFEU as well as its wider legislative
context, especially Article 21 ESM Treaty, and defies the teleo-systemic purpose
of Article 125 TFEU in the treaty context, provided by Articles 120 to 127
TFEU. It opts instead for a reading based on a meta-teleological objective, that
is, the principle of solidarity to preserve the euro, in defiance of the express
legislative choice made by Article 125 TFEU, namely that a sound budgetary
policy is to be achieved through national budgetary responsibility, as well as the
basic economic axiom that mutualization of debt reduces, and does not enhance,
incentives to pursue sound budgetary policies. In Gauweiler, the CJEU chooses
to disregard implementing legislation, especially Council Regulation 3603/03,
relevant to the interpretation of Articles 123 and 127 TFEU. Furthermore, the
Court, in defiance of its own settled case law, effectively granted the ECB the
right to create new monetary policy. This, in spite of the TFEU manifestly
restricting the ECB to the pursuit of price stability and the management of
foreign exchange operations, and the maintenance of the payments system
within the Eurozone.
VIII. Conclusion
The foregoing discussion has shown that in the areas of the division of compe-
tences, EU citizenship, and fundamental rights and in the Eurozone litigation
the CJEU has adopted a strongly integrationist and meta-teleological approach
which goes well beyond the cumulative approach suggested in Merck v
Hauptzollamt Hamburg-Jonas.87 The most extensive body of examples of the
Court’s integrationist and meta-teleological bias is provided by its numerous
decisions on the scope of and individual rights conferred by EU citizenship. In
this area the Court has used the ‘equal treatment’ principle of the EU Treaties
progressively to override more restrictive secondary legislation, which limits the
entitlement of economically inactive EU migrants, by reference to the require-
ment that they must have sufficient resources to maintain themselves. The
adoption of Directive 2004/38 explicitly spells out that requirement, which
logically follows from the fact that the EU Treaties restrict the right to in-
work benefits of current and former EU migrant workers, but not of econom-
ically inactive EU migrants. Once in Grzelczyk and D’Hoop the CJEU had
relaxed that requirement, and thus, in effect, judicially amended the Treaties,
87 Case C-292/82 Merck v Hauptzollamt Hamburg-Jonas [1983] ECR-3781, para. 12.
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the Court, in subsequent cases, could then justify further extensions of benefits
entitlement by reference to its earlier case law, which in all but name replaced
the more restrictive legislation with a more permissive judicial interpretation.
In Gauweiler, the Court disregarded settled case law, which ran counter to its
integrationist objective. In its citizenship judgments, to reinforce a previous
departure from the wording of the Treaties and the Directive, the decisions of
the Court abound with references to previous decisions, in preference to an
analysis of the precise wording of the underlying legislative provisions. The
Court’s approach to its own previous decisions is thus highly selective. It will
liberally rely on previous decisions when this lends an air of the familiar and
legal objectivity to justify an integrationist decision, whilst it will readily ignore a
previous decision if it runs counter to the Court’s pro-Union, integrationist
objectives.
The Court’s meta-teleological or integrationist leanings tend to be far less
evident and often irrelevant in cases which deal with specific issues in EU
legislation in the fields of agriculture and fisheries, the environment, competi-
tion, or transport, which raise no fundamental issues involving the interests of
the Union or the division of powers between the EU and the Member States,
and where the various interpretative criteria rarely point to very different con-
clusions. In these circumstances the Court rarely does violence to the language
of the legislation.88
However, where the outcome matters, in the sense that the case itself affects
the interests of the Union or raises significant issues for the EU legal order as a
whole, the Court of Justice’s cumulative approach gives the Court almost com-
plete freedom of interpretation, because it maximizes methodological flexibility
and uncertainty, as illustrated by decisions adopted in the area of EU
Citizenship or the Eurozone. The Court of Justice regards itself free to consider
literal, systemic, and teleological considerations, without any rule of priority or
hierarchy between them and with no fixed weight to be given to each consid-
eration. In ‘constitutional’, human rights, or competence cases, it will usually
follow the ordinary meaning where it supports an integrationist answer to the
legal question raised, but where the literal meaning does not, it will commonly
prefer to rely on other arguments where those are more favourable to an ex-
pansive reading of the competences of the EU institutions. Nor does the Court
regard itself as bound by its precedents. It readily cites its own case law in
support of its integrationist conclusions, but disregards previous decisions
when they run counter to judicial preference.
The cumulative approach leaves the Court free to give the greatest weight to
whatever criterion supports its preferred conclusion, and if it chooses purpose, it
may pick and choose whatever purposes best suits the Court’s intentions. The
purposes the Court may then invoke are not necessarily confined to those
88 For a more detailed discussion, see Beck (n 23), 344–5.
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written into the Treaty, nor to the most immediate objects evident from the
legislative context—purpose, in the CJEU’s view, may be presumed as well as
treaty-based, and the Court may refer to meta-teleological considerations just as
readily as to either the immediate or indirect purposes, each of which may be
either subjectively or objectively construed, depending on which most readily
support the Court’s preferred solution. Moreover, by purpose the Court may
also refer to effects, means, functional criteria, or general consequences. In
general terms, whether explicitly or impliedly, when the Court invokes purpos-
ive interpretative criteria, it almost always falls back on what best suits EU
integration, even where this contradicts specific Treaty provisions and thus con-
flicts with the lex specialis principle in international law.
Paradoxically, the decision making of the CJEU is not subject to unusually
high legal uncertainty. The CJEU’s decisions are probably more certain than
those of other courts. They are certain, however, not because its approach is
governed by a high degree of methodological rigour, but because the Court’s
pro-Union predisposition is so settled. Judicial predisposition, not method or
logic, is the best guide to the Court of Justice’s legal argumentation. The CJEU
may thus be regarded as a tribunal which combines a relatively high degree of
legal certainty in its decisions with extreme methodological freedom in its ju-
dicial reasoning—a degree of methodological flexibility which, in its flexible
approach to the use of the various interpretative criteria, previous judicial deci-
sions, and the Court’s ready reliance on non-textual and meta-teleological con-
siderations, must be placed at the extreme ‘teleological’ end of the interpretative
options provided by the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. If, as all
good law should be, the Vienna Convention is construed as imposing genuine
methodological constraints, then the CJEU, in so far as its flexible interpretative
approach frees it from almost any methodological constraints, frequently oper-
ates outside the interpretative freedom afforded by Articles 31 and 32 VCLT. It
upholds instead its own communautaire version of a ‘good faith’ reading of legal
provisions, relying upon or disregarding at leisure settled canons of interpret-
ation as well as the ordinary meaning of EU Treaty and legislation provisions.
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